Middle East Proliferation- Myth or Reality?

The spectre of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons has been causing apprehension in the West lately. There has been much concern about the potential consequences of Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. There has been concern about the security of Israel, especially after the rise to power of conservative politicians in Iran, who have made clear their disdain for Israel. In addition, the fear of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has been much touted. The Middle East is unstable at this moment in time as a result of a range of socio-economic and political factors; this has raised the dilemma of a nuclear Iran acting as a catalyst of further regional instability by stimulating the nuclearisation of neighbouring states. This article aims to explore the plausibility of the notion that Iran “going nuclear” would set in motion a process of frantic acquisition of nuclear weapons by the surrounding states. The key Muslim states in the region at this moment in time are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey. These countries will be analysed in order to explore whether a nuclear Iran would lead to attempts by these countries to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq will not be included as it is in no state to attempt anything at the moment in time due to internal security problems and Libya will not be analysed due to its abandonment of its nuclear programme in 2003 and subsequent rapprochement with the West.

Egypt

There has been general anxiety in Egypt about Israel’s nuclear programme and its impact upon stability in the Middle East since the sixties. In the era of Gamal Abdul Nasser Egypt took some tentative steps to acquire nuclear weapons, but his moves were obstructed by Russia and China. The sixties were a period of heightened Israeli-Arab tensions, resulting in the Arab military defeat in 1967. Rather than spurring the desire to acquire nuclear weapons, this defeat in fact led to the conviction that a nuclear Middle East would cause further instability and impact adversely on Egypt’s quest for regional leadership. Since the 1970s, Egypt has consistently advocated that the region become a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone and has even sought to enhance its leadership role by promoting this agenda.

It is true that a nuclear Iran could change Egyptian attitudes towards acquiring nuclear weapons, but there would still be major constraints that Egypt would have to overcome. In relation to developing its own military nuclear capability, there are clear technological and economic hurdles that Egypt would have to overcome in order to achieve this. The intent of this article is not to examine the economic and technological capacity of Egypt in depth but it is reasonable to assume that if Egypt were to make the political decision to go nuclear, that these issues would need to be assessed and at this moment in time Egypt lacks the industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, a major hurdle to any such aspirations. In addition to this hurdle Egypt would face external constraints. There is no doubt that Egypt would have to take into account its relationship with the U.S., which Hosni Mubarak has most recently described as "strategic and strong." Egypt becoming a suspected nuclear actor would seriously jeopardize the country's relations with the U.S., and this would be a very high price to pay, especially as Egypt is one of the largest recipients of economic and military aid from the US .

In addition, the US has been a strong supporter of the Mubarak regime and any inclination towards nuclear acquirement could lead to suspension of this support and the encouragement of political change in Egypt – clearly detrimental to the monopoly of power Mubarak and his acolytes enjoy in Egypt. It is also important to bear in mind that Egypt going nuclear would upset relations with Israel which have been relatively stable since the Camp David Accords of 1978. Therefore it seems that Egypt does not have the capacity or inclination to produce nuclear weapons at this moment in time. Even if the government contemplated the acquisition of nuclear materials, the inevitable damage to relations with the US would act as a major disincentive.

Turkey

Contemporary relations between Turkey and Iran are still marked by a history of conflict and hostility – stretching back to the time of the Safavid dynasty. Despite improvements in relations during the 20th century, there have still been periods of strong hostility – stemming in part from Turkish accusations of Iran supporting Kurdish separatism. It could be surmised that Turkish distrust and the bad history between the two countries would be sufficient for Turkey to develop its own nuclear programme. No doubt there are voices in Turkey that are calling for an indigenous nuclear programme, but there are various other factors which need to be taken into consideration which would act as major constraints on such a decision.

Turkey's foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era remain highly dependant on European and American acceptance. Given the nature of this relationship, were Iran to go nuclear, Turkey is unlikely to begin its own nuclear programme, due to the potential damage to its relations with the West. Secondly, Turkey does not consider that she is the cause of Iran seeking to “nuclearise” in the first place. The closer that Turkey sticks to EU policy, the better position it will find itself in relation to accession talks. Entertaining the nuclear option would no doubt further stall Turkey’s European aspirations, if not end them all together. Turkey’s hopes of entering the EU will not just depend on a wholesale transformation in the economic and human rights fields, but also its foreign policy moves, especially how it would react to a nuclear Iran.

Therefore Turkey's long-lasting odyssey in search of EU accession – while at the same time balancing the security and military concerns of the US, Israel, and the EU – will act as a major check on Turkey. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, which has acted as a linchpin of Turkish security since that time. Even after the Iranian revolution, this has remained the case, thus Turkey is unlikely to renege on this security arrangement via the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the new conservatives in Iran today seem extremely pragmatic rather than ideological, therefore the likelihood of Iran exporting the principles of the Iranian revolution seem a remote possibility. This fact will calm the nerves of Turkey’s secular elite.

Saudi Arabia

It is also unlikely that Saudi Arabia would seek a nuclear option in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran. Like Turkey, there are a number of policy constraints along that path and Saudi is more likely to revert to more stringent internal policies than attempt a tilt toward strategic or medium-range nuclear technology.

Ten to fifteen years ago, a nuclear Iran might have been a significant threat to Saudi Arabia, due to the ill treatment the Shi'a population in its Eastern province suffer. Although discrimination continues against the Shi’a in Saudi, the authorities have now opened dialogue with Shi’a leaders, and the election of 11 Shi’a candidates into municipal councils during 2004 has no doubt acted as a source of improving Iran-Saudi relations. In addition, the Shi’a in Saudi usually refer to Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Iraq, who has a quietist attitude towards politics in comparison to Ayatollah Khameini in Iran. Therefore Iran is unlikely to have major influence among the Shi’a of Saudi; this will ease Saudi worries of Iranian encouragement of internal Shi’a uprisings. The signing of the 2001 Iran-Saudi security agreement is another indication of improving relations and as a result Iran cannot be considered an imminent threat to Saudi security. If there was a military threat from Iran, there is no doubt that a quick response would come from the West, especially the US which has depended on Saudi oil for decades. Saudi is an important state for the US and any attack on Saudi would destabilise the whole Persian Gulf, sharply affecting the world’s supply of oil. This would be disastrous for Western economies, making US intervention to counteract an Iranian military threat inevitable.
In addition, the US has been apprehensive due to the possibility of the Saudi regime being removed by Islamists, leading to the establishment of a Caliphate. The possibility of a Caliphate emerging as a challenge to its hegemony is sufficient to worry the US; add nuclear capabilities and these fears increase. Therefore it is definitely in US national interests to thwart any Saudi attempts to develop nuclear weapons. US interests are a major constraint on Saudi ambitions, but nevertheless the US continues to be the guarantor of the Saudi regime’s security.

Syria

Relations between Iran and Syria have been on good terms since the 1970s. Mutual interests have characterised the relations between the two countries. Chief among these are the threats both countries have faced from Iraq, Turkey and Israel. In addition, today both countries are subject to criticism from the US and potential military attack in the future. In response to US threats, the two countries have strengthened their relations. In February 2005, the two countries announced that they had formed a military pact, a direct result of growing US dominance in the region and aggression towards both countries.

Given the good relations between Syria and Iran, it is unlikely that Syria would attempt to develop nuclear weapons due to Iran doing so; in fact a nuclear Iran would be in the interest of Syria. The prospect of friendly relations with a nuclear actor could strengthen the Syrian hand in relations with the US, Turkey and Israel. In addition, if one looks to the international pressure and scrutiny of the Assad regime following the Hariri assassination, it seems unlikely that Syria would consider developing nuclear weapons. The Assad regime at this moment in time is concerned with political survival. Pressure is growing from all sides, the continuing inquiry into Hariri’s assassination and a new Khaddam-Muslim Brotherhood alliance are adding to the difficulties facing the regime. External pressure could tempt the government to consider acquiring nuclear weapons, rather than the ‘threat’ of a nuclear Iran, but given the difficulties Syria faces at this moment in time, it is unlikely to make its situation more complicated and add further pressure on itself by seeking nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

The cases analysed above indicate that the fear of regional powers acquiring nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear Iran seems more myth rather than reality. A number of hurdles and obstacles face the countries discussed before they could even begin to contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons. US interests are the key factor behind the Middle Eastern proliferation story that is currently being touted. In order to build a case to argue against Iran developing nuclear weapons, justifications are required. The regional proliferation story works, but in reality this line does not stand scrutiny, it only hides true US interests. The US has been concerned by the prospect of a regional actor emerging in the Middle East that could potentially threaten its military dominance in the region. A nuclear Iran would undermine US dominance in the Middle East as it could no longer dictate but would have to consult and listen. In addition, the possibility of being driven out of the vitally important Persian Gulf by a nuclear Iran haunts the US, as it would be catastrophic to US interests. It is these interests that are driving US policy towards Iran rather than fear of instability in the region. If the US was concerned with instability in the Middle East it would have changed its decades-old policy of supporting Israeli aggression against Palestinians, and backing Arab dictators; the US would not have attacked Iraq nor instigated the War on Terror. This US policy has acted as a key source of de-stabilisation rather than stability in the Middle East. The key driving force behind US foreign policy continues to be national interests and it is these interests that are pushing the propaganda campaign to prevent the emergence of a nuclear Iran.