Britishness and Identity Politics

Hello

The below article is by Dr Abdul Wahid, an Islamic thinker, looking into debates relating to britishness and identity politics in the UK.


Introduction

Gordon Brown, Michael Howard, Boris Johnson, David Blunkett and Trevor Phillips are just a few of the names that have dared to tackle the complex and controversial subject of British citizenship. The subject is complex, because Britain was always a convenient political identity to try to preserve an uncomfortable union between dominant England and its vanquished neighbours. It is controversial because its prominence has been brought about because one section of the British population – the Muslim community – has caused concerns. Most concerns have been dominated by allegations of a security threat by an ‘enemy within’, seemingly realised after the 7/7 bombings, but for those who had studied the issues for longer, concerns really emerged when the Muslim community in Europe had such a strong reactions to the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. The blame was placed firmly on the policy of multiculturalism for institutionalising difference, the lack of a strong and distinct British identity and the failure of Islam to ‘reform’, meaning to secularise.

At best the responses produced to solving the problem of defining what is meant by ‘Britishness’ are, in my view, destined to fail. At worse, where they confuse security and religious reform with citizenship and identity, they could backfire spectacularly. It is measure of the failure of the debate that such a fundamental discussion has been framed as a reaction to specific events, and has placed the burdens of change upon one specific community.

Where should the blame lie?

Those who would blame Islam and Muslims for the failure to be well integrated stakeholders in society should pause for thought. It is easy to cite examples that Muslim US citizens fought against US troops in Afghanistan (John Walker Lindh for example) or that Muslims were amongst those rioting in Paris earlier this year. However, the images of an alienated black underclass in New Orleans, exposed by Hurricane Katrina, should pose an immediate challenge to complacent views that somehow other minorities are thoroughly assimilated. Furthermore the involvement of immigrants of more than one religion in the riots in Paris prompts the memory of similar riots in Brixton and Toxteth some years ago. If we are looking for a scapegoat there is more of a case to make for targeting French style secular assimilation, or the so-called American dream, than Muslims and their alleged failure to fully integrate into British society.

Fundamental mistakes: National identities, shared values and uniform ‘Britishness’

The contribution to this debate by Gordon Brown in his speech to the Fabian Society conference of 2006 was arguably the most significant contribution made thus far in the whole debate. Brown argued that Britain has a history in which people manage their multiple identities well. He felt that this was still possible as long as Britishness was built upon a shared history, a shared sense of purpose and shared underlying values.

In my view it is neither possible nor desirable to focus upon identities built on national identity, as articulated through an ‘official’ narrative, nor upon certain adopted values. It is simply not possible to unify people based upon such matters as a common history, heritage or shared cultural values. This is because it is almost impossible for people in a globalised world to share the same narrative of any nation’s history, particularly in countries with large immigrant minorities from ex-colonies. Furthermore, there is the ever increasing prominence of supranational identity – be it either European or Internationalist in outlook.



There is no currently unified or uniform view of Britishness that many such as Brown or Howard allude to. How could there possibly be? A white Anglo-Saxon Protestant has a very different historical heritage, culture or religion to a citizen who is Celtic, Catholic, Hindu or Muslim. Someone who’s ancestry can be traced back to the British Isles will have a very different view of history to someone whose ancestry is from an ex-colony. Even within one ‘ethnic’ subgroup a senior citizen, whose views in life have been shaped by two world wars, will have very different values to someone whose formative years were during the swinging sixties or the yuppy eighties.

To try to unify such a diverse society in this manner would do one of two things. Either one would simply define the lowest common denominator of shared culture, which is hardly likely to fill people with any great national pride, or one could try and impose a dominant ‘nationalistic’ interpretation of a culture on the whole of society. The former approach goes to the heart of the recent criticism of multiculturalism. The latter represents the worst form of citizenship – whether it be manifested in Britain, France or even Muslim countries like Pakistan. It is the ugly rabid form of nationalism which often leads to jingoism and feelings of racial supremacy.

So, what about shared values? Do they exist? It would be supremely arrogant for the political ruling class to define a certain view of Britishness based on certain values they advocate. It would be doubly arrogant to then dictate to large numbers of minorities a narrow view of what the best values were, or worse what were acceptable political views. The Brown / Fabian approach was just an attempt to do this, to the extent that the view of British values excluded even much of the political ‘right’.

To a large extent this has become institutionalised by the present government through its educational citizenship programme, both in schools and for immigrants. The values based approach is coercive, often aggressively promoted in the media, encouraging people to adopt certain values, and abandon some of their own. This is the reason that the pressure on Muslims to ‘reform’ Islam has become entwined with the politics of identity. Such an imposition of values completely circumvents any opportunity for reasoned debate, or ideological discussion of the relative merits of different ideas and beliefs.

There is a real danger that putting such a strong emphasis on controversial values, history or institutions as a litmus test for citizenship in the absence of conviction or genuine agreement will create different levels of citizenship. Muslim citizens for example are often made to feel that they must display more loyalty to symbols of the State such as the Crown than others in society, many of whom have little or no respect for the Crown (indeed a sizeable minority of British citizens and a majority of the Fabian conference delegates would quite happily confine the monarchy to the dustbin of history). Some expect the Muslim community for instance to show respect and trust in Parliament despite the fact that 40% of the mainstream population showed their own respect and confidence in the system by not voting at the last general election.

Even ignoring these contrasts, there are immense pressures from the media on Muslims and others who hold a very strong religious faith, to adopt liberal secular values. Not conforming to the dominant view leaves those citizens open to vilification or ridicule. This pressure creates a socially imposed censorship on the views of a significant minority every bit as sinister as the legalised censorship that is enforced in the anti-terror laws. Both forms of censorship effectively censor views the former on a number of matters relating to social domestic policy, the latter relating to foreign policy under the guise of ‘glorifying’ terrorism.


Helpful advice from the Muslim experience?

A system much admired in European history for its achievements in Andalusia was the Islamic Caliphate. From its outset in the Middle East the Caliphate achieved a largely cohesive citizenship between people of different races and religions. In the context of that diverse society Sir Thomas Arnold once wrote:

"We have never heard about any attempt to compel Non-Muslim parties to adopt Islam or about any organized persecution aiming at exterminating Christianity. If the Caliphs had chosen one of these plans, they would have wiped out Christianity as easily as what happened to Islam during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain; by the same method which Louis XIV followed to make Protestantism a creed whose followers were to be sentenced to death; or with the same ease of keeping the Jews away from Britain for a period of three hundred fifty years. The Eastern Churches in Asia were entirely cut off from communion with the rest of Christiandom, throughout which no one would have been found to lift a finger on their behalf, as heretical communions. So that the very survival of these Churches to the present day is a strong proof of the generally tolerant attitude of Mohammedan [sic] governments towards them”. Arnold, Sir Thomas W. THE PREACHING OF ISLAM, A HISTORY OF THE PROPAGATION OF THE MUSLIM FAITH, Westminster A. Constable & Co., London, 1896, p. 80.

There are two essential points to consider based upon the model that Arnold describes. Firstly, the level of commitment to the state that needed to be shown by any citizen was obedience to the law. That was all. Not that they be forced to believe in the source of that law. Had non-Muslims been asked to proclaim that the source of law was divine it would have violated the Islamic principle: ‘there is no compulsion in the deen (religion).’ People who did not share the fundamental beliefs and values of lslam were not expected to change their religion to Islam, nor to omit verses from the Torah and Bible to conform with Islam. To ask for that would have been tantamount to a forced conversion, and could only have been described as totalitarian. Of course many will argue that Muslims are also not being asked to leave their faith, yet what is effectively being asked of Muslims is to secularise their faith to conform with the dominant value system found in western societies. As Islam does not recognise a separation between religion and state, asking Muslims to adopt divergent values and concepts is tantamount to asking them to leave important parts of their holistic faith.

The second point to reflect upon is that people in the society Arnold described trusted the system, felt secure and as a consequence felt like stakeholders. People feel secure, and consequently feel ‘at home’ when they have equal access to justice, have opportunities for redress and have space to hold on to their beliefs. The Caliphate gave citizens of different faith the space to practice their faith and even exempted them from the obligations of citizenship that were specifically linked to the Islamic belief.

This view that the predominant expectation of any citizen should be no more that to abide by the law and display civility in interaction with others is not unique to the Caliphate. It is one that some brave voices do air, and it is a demonstration of confidence in ones values and state.

The ties that bind

The push for a nationalistic, values based citizenship is therefore a divisive and coercive approach, which sadly dominates much of the identity debate today. It betrays a lack of confidence, and perhaps substance in the dominant values and symbols of national pride that are being forced on society today. Sadly, this will not create the harmony that many may intend, only harm.

In the end people, and especially minorities, feel they have a stake in society when they feel welcome, are given space to find their feet and practice their own faith in a protected sphere, without vilification and pressure to reform their religion from its basis. They feel they have a stake when they feel that justice and opportunities are truly for all. In such a way there is a natural process of attachment to ones home, an appreciation of the natural environment in which one lives, and an adoption of those aspects of culture that do not contradict ones principles. This is the natural process that existed for centuries in the Muslim world that allowed minorities – religious and ethnic – to feel attached to their state, preserving many rich cultural variations in a way that did not cause division and resentment.

For Muslims in modern Europe – including Britain - this has not only been denied through the attempts at social censorship on the personal views of Muslims, laws banning the hijab (and now the jilbab), a discriminatory foreign policy and oppressive legislation, none of which will help the process of harmonizing society.

This was the lesson of Northern Ireland. This was the lesson of Lord Scarman after the race riots of the eighties. Yet this is the path that politicians tread once again. Sadly, this is a shared history that does not appear to have been bought into.